
by Vira Konyk, President of the Congress of Ukrainians of Estonia
In recent weeks, Estonia’s information space has seen a worrying surge in Russian hybrid tactics. Through Telegram channels and the VKontakte network, a large-scale disinformation campaign has been unfolding, calling for the creation of a so-called “Narva People’s Republic.” Fabricated maps, the spread of symbols of this phantom entity, and direct calls for sabotage and arming echo the events of 2014 in Ukraine, when the Kremlin artificially promoted “people’s republics” in Donbas to lay the groundwork for a forceful territorial takeover.
These campaigns should not be dismissed as low-quality or primitive propaganda. What we are seeing is a clearly coordinated attempt by the Kremlin to test NATO’s eastern flank at a time when global attention is divided by other conflicts.
Historical parallels
Narva is a border city where around 90% of residents are Russian-speaking. This makes the region vulnerable to manipulation – something Russia already attempted in 1993. Back then, destabilization efforts were contained politically, but today the level of threat and potential consequences are far more serious. Russia is using social media to create the illusion of mass support, even though real backing remains low. Narva residents can see the difference every day between living standards in Estonia and in neighboring Ivangorod, Russia.
Still, the threat should not be underestimated. The emergence of the “Narva Republic” narrative coincides with a series of provocations: violations of Estonia’s airspace, incidents along the border, and pressure on energy infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. The Kremlin’s goal is clear – to divert Western attention away from supporting Ukraine by forcing European governments to focus on internal security threats.
Having learned from Ukraine’s experience, Estonia is meeting these challenges prepared. A key signal is that the Estonian parliament has commissioned a large-scale study to develop a new security strategy for today’s environment. This reflects a serious, analytical approach to safeguarding sovereignty and addressing new types of threats.
Authorities are acting on multiple fronts – from restricting Russian information channels to strengthening civil defense. The “Be Prepared” campaign, launched in 2022, now reaches all levels of society, from major cities to small apartment associations. People are learning how to respond in crises, understanding that a “go-bag” is not panic, but part of a broader security culture.
A symptom of aggression
The most complex issue remains the loyalty of part of the Russian-speaking population. There is a paradox: people hold Estonian citizenship but remain mentally within Russia’s sphere of influence. For Estonia, this is a serious lesson and a reason to rethink integration policies. The Congress of Ukrainians of Estonia actively counters these dynamics by monitoring the media space and pushing back against anti-Ukrainian narratives.
We also actively encourage Ukrainians to join the Kaitseliit, Estonia’s voluntary defense league. Ukrainian women who found refuge in Estonia are now becoming part of the country’s defense structure, showing solidarity and a willingness to defend the country that has become their second home.
The key lesson Europe must draw from developments in Narva and Ukraine is the danger of a reactive approach. We cannot afford to wait for escalation before acting. The capabilities of the European Union and NATO far exceed those of Russia, but this advantage only matters if there is full unity and determination.
Attempts to create “people’s republics” in the Baltic states are a symptom of aggression—one that can only be addressed through strength and a proactive strategy. Only a united Europe can contain the aggressor within its borders and guarantee security for every city—from Mariupol to Narva. Forces committed to stability and international law must stand as one against the Russian regime while there is still time to stop it.
Cover: DepositPhotos